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Abstract
In metaphysics, the fundamental is standardly equated with that which has no explana-
tion – with that which is, in other words, ‘brute’. But this doctrine of brutalism is in tension
with physicists’ ambitions to not only describe but also explain why the fundamental is as
it is. The tension would ease were science taken to be incapable of furnishing the sort of
explanations that brutalism is concerned with, given that these are understood to be dis-
tinctively ‘metaphysical’ in character. But to assume this is to assume a sharp demarcation
between physics and metaphysics that surely cannot be taken for granted.
This paper sets out to examine the standing of brutalism from the perspective of contem-
porary fundamental physics, together with theories of explanation drawn from philosophy
of science and metaphysics. Focusing on what fundamental kinds the world instantiates and
how physicists go about determining them, I argue that a partial explanation, in Hempel’s
sense, may be given of this fundamental feature. Moreover, since this partial explanation
issues, at least in part, from stipulations as to the essential nature of the kinds involved, I
claim that it has as much right to be regarded as ametaphysical explanation as do grounding
explanations. As such, my conclusion will be that the doctrine of brutalism can no longer
be regarded as tenable: at least modulo certain plausible essentialist assumptions, it is no
longer the case that no explanation can be given of the fundamental.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses a certain metaphysical proclivity: that of reflexively equating the funda-
mental with that which has no explanation. It addresses, that is, our habit of identifying the
fundamental with that which is simply brute.1 Consider for example the following quotes.
1This is the sense of ‘brute’ one typically finds in the literature when the term is articulated explicitly. Thus, for
Fahrbach (2005, p. 449), ‘Brute facts are facts that have no explanation’; for Barnes (1994, pp. 61, 62), they
are those ‘for which there is no further reason or explanation’, those which occur ‘for no reason whatsoever’.
For Melnyk (1997, p. 636) brute facts are those that ‘simply have no explanation’; for Parfit (1998b, p. 22),
‘no explanation of any kind’. For Markosian (1998, p. 242), they are those for which we ‘can just shrug and
say, “There is no reason”’; for Dasgupta (2014, p. 9), those which are ‘arbitrary’, for which there is ‘no rhyme
or reason’, and ‘no explanation’. Similarly, G. Strawson (2006, p. 18) presents the ‘brute’ as that for which
there is ‘absolutely no reason in the nature of things’ as to why it exists or is the way that it is. Now to be sure,
sometimes ‘brute’ is taken in a stronger sense, a sense in which some explanation or reason may be given for
brute entities, so long as those explanations fall short of entailing or determining them. Hudson (1997, p. 77),
for example, in his discussion of the principle of su cient reason, takes a brute fact to be one ‘for which there
is no su cient reason or explanation’ (italics added) as to why it holds. Since my argument concerns partial
1
• ‘Say that a fact is fundamental (or brute) i↵ it does not obtain in virtue of other facts’
(Rosen 2012, p. 126).
• ‘The fundamental (or brute) truths (if such there be) give us the ultimate foundation for
the whole of reality’ (Cameron 2015, p. 115).
• ‘Fundamental or “brute” facts must be facts within physics’ (Arno’dottir and Crane
2013, p. 252).
• ‘There are those facts that are apt for having a ground but lack one. These are the so-called
“fundamental” or “brute” facts (Dasgupta 2016, p. 7).
Such claims strike the contemporary metaphysical consciousness as perfectly unremarkable, and
all present ‘fundamental’ and ‘brute’ as basically interchangable terms. It seems, then, that in
metaphysics we are inured to the idea that being fundamental and having no explanation are
essentially synonymous notions. As such, the idea that the ‘fundamental facts just are those
facts which have no further explanation’ typically passes without any query or comment, much
less with any objection.2 Call this idea that the fundamental entities lack any further explanation
‘brutalist fundamentalism’, or, for brevity, brutalism.
While the doctrine of brutalism has arguably been with us since antiquity, it finds renewed
expression in much of the recent discussion on ‘grounding’. Grounding has emerged as the
prefered relation with which to relate the fundamental to the less fundamental, and so to define
the ‘layered’ structure that Scha↵er claims has moved to the fore.3 Such an approach motivates
defining the fundamental in terms of its lack of ground.4 While debates abound as to how
precisely one is to understand the notion of grounding, a common factor in all these discussions
is that it is a non-causal explanatory relation of some sort.5 Indeed, grounding is often presented
as the relation of ‘metaphysical explanation’, as though to give a metaphysical explanation just
is to give a statement of grounds. Consider for example the following.
• ‘I take grounding to be metaphysical explanation: to say that   grounds  is to say that  
provides a metaphysical explanation of  ’ (Litland 2013, p. 20).
• ‘Some truths metaphysically explain, or ground, another truth just in case the laws of
metaphysics determine the latter truth on the basis of the former’ (Wilsch 2016, p. 1).
explanation – a form of explanation falling short of full determination – it will not touch, or at least not directly,
on the brutalist’s commitments if taken in this stronger sense. But since the weaker view in which the fundamental
has ‘no explanation whatsoever’ seems to be that which is intended far more often, I both use the word with that
meaning here and take others to do so similarly, unless they explicitly indicate otherwise. But in any case, my
target is the canonical metaphysical thesis that the fundamental is that which has ‘no explanation’, however it is
we choose to define the word ‘brute’.
2DeRossett 2010, p. 81 (italics added).
3See e.g. Scha↵er 2009.
4E.g. Scha↵er op. cit., p. 373, takes ‘x is fundamental’ to be defined by ‘nothing grounds x’. Of course, there
are other approaches one could take to defining fundamentality. My argument will be largely independent of
these debates: all that matters for my purposes is that what fundamental kinds the world admits constitutes a
fundamental fact about it, however it is that ‘fundamental’ is ultimately defined.
5Some take grounding relations to be relations of explanation, others that which metaphysical explanations refer to.
Either way, relations of grounding are understood to be essential to the provision of metaphysical explanations.
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• ‘This attitude may be justified when it comes to some versions of the PSR... One way
that this version di↵ers from others is that it is concerned with one particular mode of
explanation, what is nowadays referred to as metaphysical or grounding explanation.”
(Dasgupta 2016, p. 3)
All these statements present ‘grounding explanation’ as basically interchangeable with ‘meta-
physical explanation’. Thus if the fundamental is by definition that which is ungrounded, and
if grounding is the relation of explanation relevant to metaphysics, then – as far as metaphysics
is concerned at least – the fundamental is that which cannot be explained. But to define the
fundamental in that way is just to express the doctrine of brutalism.
Brutalism, then, seems to get reflexive endorsement by metaphysicians, and is supported
by a cluster of ideas circulating around the concept of grounding. However, for all its seeming
innocuousness, I myself think we should be worried about brutalism. Prompting the worry is
the fact that brutalism appears, on the face of it at least, to be in tension with another orthodox
metaphysical doctrine – namely, the doctrine of physicalism.6 For physicalism is the thesis that
‘the fundamental properties and facts are physical and everything else obtains in virtue of them’;
as such, in worlds in which physicalism holds sway it is up to physics to discover what these
fundamental facts and properties are.7 But while metaphysicians present these facts, whatever
they may turn out to be, as that which by definition cannot be explained, it seems physicists have
in recent years become increasingly optimistic about their ability to do just that. For Steven
Weinberg, for example – Nobel Laureate and de facto chief spokesperson for the particle physics
community – ‘the aim of physics at its most fundamental level is not just to describe the world
but to explain why it is the way it is’.8 But it seems that by the lights of brutalism such an
ambition is simply incoherent. And while we surely ought to maintain some degree of criticality
over an utterance of one of particle physics’ chief propagandists, I think we should be hesitant
about attributing to him an incoherence in his attitude toward his subject matter.
There is of course an obvious response the brutalist might make to this worry, which is
to point out that there need be no contradiction between their concept of the fundamental and
the ambitions of physicists such as Weinberg. For while both physicists and metaphysicians
are often acutely concerned with the fundamental, and indeed both in the business of providing
explanations, the latter will claim that the sort of explanation that those scientists have in mind
is not one that is relevant to their concerns. Indeed, everyone is happy with the idea that there
are facts about the fundamental level that are open to causal explanation – such as why two
electrons just collided where they did – so that the sort of explanation relevant to brutalism
must be restricted to distinctively metaphysical forms if it is to be tenable.9 The fundamental’s
openness to scientific explanation thus does nothing to undermine the doctrine, and equally
assuages any worries about burdening scientists with any conceptual incoherence. Regardless,
6In fact, this much not need be assumed for my purposes: all my argument requires is that the most fundamental
physical facts are among the fundamental facts, even if they do not exhaust them. But seeing as physicalism ‘is
about as close to a bit of orthodoxy as one will find in contemporary philosophy’ (Hall 2010), we might as well
make the stronger assumption.
7Loewer 2001, p. 39.
8Weinberg 1992 (1994), p. 219.
9Cf. Dasgupta, op. cit, p. 6.
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then, of whether physicists succeed in their ambitions, the brutalist can relax.10
But for all that, I stand firm in my conviction that the time has come for us to give up
brutalism. In what follows, I will make the case for that by (a) o↵ering a model for how, in
accordance with the aspirations of physicists, we might be said to explain some fundamental
facts about the world (the more ‘constructive’ part), and (b) arguing that this puts pressure on
the metaphysical doctrine of brutalism (the more ‘critical’ part). I will argue in particular that
there exists a fundamental fact about the world – namely, the fact of what fundamental kinds
it instantiates – for which we can provide a partial explanation in Hempel’s sense, and that
the partial explanation we obtain may justly be characterized as a metaphysical explanation.11
Hence it follows that we can no longer regard the fundamental as that which has ‘no explanation’,
as the brutalist requires. In more detail, in Section 2, I say more about brutalism, emphasizing
that according to it what fundamental kinds the world instantiates should be taken as something
for which no explanation can be given. In Section 3, I make contact with fundamental physics by
introducing quantum fields, and defend the stipulation that they are essentially such as to evolve
unitarily.12 In Section 4, I argue that if we assume that the fundamental entities are quantum
fields, so conceived, then what fundamental kinds the world can instantiate becomes subject to a
significant constraint. In Section 5, I argue that this constraint amounts to a partial explanation
of what fundamental kinds the world does instantiate, in the sense that Hempel understood
the term, and moreover a partial explanation that deserves to be classified as metaphysical. In
Section 6, I further defend that this is enough to undermine brutalism.
It will be clear, then, that the denial of brutalism I will argue for here will not come out of
thin air. Rather, my partial explanation of the fundamental will take a swathe of facts for granted,
some of which are surely controversial; indeed, since it will assume that the fundamental entities
are quantum fields of some sort, it will take certain fundamental facts for granted. But note that
there is nothing in this that undermines its status as an explanation. After all, I am not maintain-
ing that nothing is brute, or that brute facts never appear in explanations, as would be required
by the principle of su cient reason; rather, my purpose is to dispute that the fundamental can be
identified with that which has no explanation. Some fundamental features with some explanation
would seem to be enough to establish that. Nor, as I will argue, is there anything about the fact
that the explanans itself cites certain fundamental facts that ‘trivializes’ the explanation to be
o↵ered. For all that, the argument does have many moving parts, and I am sure that everyone
will take issue with something. But I hope that we will at least be able to agree at the end that
brutalism has been shown to be much less deserving a candidate for reflexive assent than has
been previously thought. If the net result of the case to be laid out here is that brutalism be-
comes subject to the scrutiny befitting of a central metaphysical thesis – subsequently endorsed,
if it is, in a sharpened-up form and for clearer and more conscious reasons – it will have served
10It should perhaps be noted that the assimilation of ‘scientific’ explanation with causal explanation specifically
pervades both the metaphysics and the philosophy of science literature (see e.g. Loewer 2012 for a recent exam-
ple). Recent work in philosophy of science has disputed this ‘causal hegemony’ (see e.g. Saatsi and Reutlinger
forthcoming), and the present work implicitly disputes it too.
11Hempel’s notion of ‘partial explanation’ will be described in Section 5 below.
12More on this meaning of this presently. But roughly, unitary evolution is what allows quantum superpositions
to persist and for outcome probabilities to be consistent with the standard Born rule prescription for calculating
them.
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a worthy purpose.
2 Tensions between Physicalism and Brutalism
Brutalism, as noted, is the view that the fundamental is brute and inexplicable. Somewhat more
fully, brutalism is the view that every fundamental fact, feature, or entity is wholly lacking in
metaphysical explanation.13 Thus were there a few facts about the fundamental that admitted of
somemetaphysical explanation – a few fundamental features here or there that we could explain
in some measure – it seems that brutalism as a metaphysical doctrine would be thrown into
crisis. Brutalism is, as it were, an all-or-nothing a↵air.
In worlds in which physicalism holds sway, as we have noted, the fundamental properties
and fundamental facts are physical facts and properties. And among the fundamental physical
facts about the world we may take to be facts concerning what fundamental kinds it instanti-
ates.14 We do after all recognize a category of fundamental kinds, and we standardly take the
world to instantiate some of them; we also take it to be physics’ job to tell us which funda-
mental kinds these are.15 And which fundamental kinds the world does instantiate should be
taken as a fundamental fact about it.16 For – to take an influential contemporary example – Sider
takes fundamental kind terms such as ‘electron’ to be paradigms of terms that ‘carve perfectly
at the joints’.17 As such, on this view, to correctly identify which fundamental kinds the world
in fact instantiates just is to correctly specify a crucial aspect of the fundamental structure of
the world.18 Thus if – as seems wholly uncontroversial – we take the fundamental structure of
13In what follows, I will talk of both facts and features as being fundamental. I will take the relata of explanations to
properly be facts. Talk of explanations of events or features will be shorthand for talk of explanations for the fact
that those events take place or that those features are instantiated.
14Here I will remain neutral on in virtue of what a kind should be classed ‘fundamental’: all we need to accept is
that there are fundamental kinds, and that some are actualized.
15Cf. Paul 2012, pp. 5-6. For an attempt to cast scepticism on the idea that the world admits of fundamental kinds,
see Scha↵er 2003. Here however I stick with the orthodoxy by assuming some actual kinds are fundamental.
16Note that one need not take, as does Lowe (2006), the category of kinds to constitute a fundamental category in
order to claim that facts about what fundamental kinds the world instantiates should be regarded as fundamental
facts. (As Armstrong 1997, p. 67, puts it, ‘The kinds mark true joints in nature. But it is not clear that we require
an independent and irreducible category of universal to accommodate the kinds’.) For we can conceive of kinds
as ‘clusters’ in some sense of perfectly natural properties, and take it to be a ‘brute fact’ which of these properties
actually cluster so as to form the actual fundamental kinds (as does e.g. Chakravartty 2007, p. 171).
17Sider (2009, 2011 passim).
18Thus suppose, for now and for argument’s sake, that the Standard Model of particle physics gives a true description
of physical reality at its most fundamental (more on the status of this assumption momentarily). In that case,
the up quark, the Higgs boson, and a massive electron neutrino will all count (along with others) among the
world’s fundamental kinds, so that distinctions between particles of these types will form (some of) the world’s
fundamental joints. It follows that at such time as we believed that protons and neutrons were fundamental – as
opposed to mere conglomorations of quarks – then we were wrong about the fundamental structure of the world,
since we mistakenly identified a non-fundamental joint with one of its fundamental joints. Further, at such time
before anyone had mooted the existence of the Higgs, we were wrong about the world’s fundamental structure
on account of our failure to recognize a fundamental joint that it has. And at such time as we still believed that
neutrinos were massless, we were also wrong about the fundamental structure of the world – this time because
we attributed to it joints that it does not have, either fundamentally or otherwise.
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the world to be a fundamental feature of it, then which fundamental kinds the world instantiates
should be taken as a fundamental feature of it too. And if – as also seems wholly uncontroversial
– we take the fact that the world has a certain fundamental structure to be a fundamental fact
about it, then the fact that the world instantiates whatever fundamental kinds it does instantiate
should be regarded as a fundamental fact about it also.19
Let us then suppose – speaking somewhat more schematically now – that the fundamental
kinds instantiated in the world are K1,...,Kp, and let us collectively denote these by FK . Then
just as the fact that the world has a certain fundamental structure is a fundamental fact about
it, the fact that the fundamental kinds it instaniates are FK is a fundamental fact about it also.
Conjoining physicalism with brutalism then entails that the fact that the fundamental kinds in-
stantiated by the world are FK is a fact for which no metaphysical explanation may be given.
Rather, the fact that the world is fundamentally carved up in this way is one that must simply be
taken as brute.
A core commitment of physicalist brutalism, then, is that if the fundamental kinds the
world instantiates turned out to be electrons, positrons, and photons, then there would be no
explanation of why this is. Similarly, if the fundamental kinds the world instantiates turned out
to consist of electrons and positrons but no photons, there would be no explanation of that either.
And were the world’s fundamental kinds to turn out to be electrons, photons, and a succession of
10 types of particle otherwise indistinguishable from electrons but for the fact each carries one
unit of charge greater than the last, ending at charge 11e, then we would be at a loss to explain
this as well; and so on. For concreteness, then, let us flag up this core implication of brutalist
physicalism.
Brutalism about fundamental kinds (B(FK)): Suppose that, of the fundamental
kinds, those instantiated in the world are K1,...,Kp. Let these kinds be collectively
denoted FK . Then that the fundamental kinds that are instantiated in the world are
FK is a fact for which no metaphysical explanation can be given.
In what follows, I will take it as a datum that we are not, right now, in any position to claim
to know what FK is: that is, I will take it we are not at present in any position to assert what
the actual inventory of fundamental kinds is. It is true that the most fundamental theory we
have managed to produce to date, the Standard Model of particle physics, presents us with an
inventory of kinds that we can with justification take to be more fundamental than any other that
we know of, and of course we can list what these are. However, we have reason to think that that
theory is not truly fundamental, and there are ‘beyond the Standard Model’ theories that posit
more fundamental kinds still. But of course brutalism does not require that the Standard Model
kinds are fundamental: all it requires is that whatever FK should turn out to be, that it is the
world’s inventory of fundamental kinds is a fact that has no explanation.
As noted, however, while brutalism is very much the received view in metaphysics, it is a
view that appears increasingly alienated from the perspective of fundamental physics. And what
I want to claim here is that it is the physicists that are right on this score, because we can give –
that is, we can already give – at least a partial explanation of the fact that the fundamental kinds
that are actually instantiated are the kinds FK . One might of course wonder how it is that we
19Cf. Sider p. 137.
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can say such a thing, given that we await knowledge of what FK is: to ask for an explanation
of p, after all, is typically to presuppose knowledge that p, and that is precisely what I claim
we don’t have.20 But what makes it possible to make this claim is that, while we may not know
what the kinds featuring in FK are, we can nevertheless derive a non-trivial constraint on them
– something that, as we will see, supports the claim that we have a partial explanation of what
fundamental kinds there are. And as we shall also see, what makes it possible to derive that
constraint is that fact that we may be in a position to assert, even in advance of knowing the
identities of the actual fundamental kinds, what sort of entity those kinds are all kinds of. String
theorists, for example, will likely defend the claim that whatever the fundamental kinds are,
they are all kinds of string. In what follows, however, and as noted in Section 1, we are going to
assume that the fundamental kinds are all kinds of quantum field, and the time has come to say
something about the motivation for and standing of that assumption.
This question of why we should make this assumption resolves itself into two: first, why
make any assumption at all about what sort of physical entities the fundamental kinds are, and
second, why take them to be quantum fields in particular. The first has an obvious (if rarely made
explicit) answer, stemming from the fact that the sorts of entities that physics has presented us
with, over the course of its history, have arguably di↵ered profoundly from one another in ways
that are metaphysically significant.21 As such, if we do not specify the sorts of entities that
we take fundamental kinds to be, then paradigmatic metaphysical questions concerning them
cannot be expected to have unambiguous answers. Nevertheless, the working assumption that
those entities are quantum fields in particular surely warrants comment – not least because it
may well be false, at least of the actual world. For the received view among physicists is that
quantum field theory cannot incorporate gravity, and yet of course we know that gravity exists.
Thus why assume that the fundamental kinds, whatever they may turn out to be, are all kinds of
quantum fields? Why not assume that they are strings instead, given that string theory is widely
taken as the most viable candidate for fundamental framework?
Several considerations support the present strategy. At the bottom of the list is the prag-
matic justification that I simply do not know how else to proceed: QFT is the most fundamental
framework both that we know how to test and that I myself have any facility with. Less pragmat-
ically, however, we may say first of all that the fact that gravity exists is presumably contingent,
and as such we can take it that there are possible worlds in which physicalism reigns and in which
quantum fields are fundamental. Since brutalism is presented as a thesis about fundamentalia
in general, hence intended as metaphysically necessary, if brutalism can be shown to be false
in these worlds then brutalism is done for even if the actual world is not among them.22 Thus
while for ease of presentation I will talk as though the fundamental kinds of the actual world are
20See e.g. Mellor 1976, p. 233: ‘An explanandum is not an hypothesis, whose truth needs inferring from more surely
known premises. It is already taken to be true, its truth indeed being what calls for explanation.’
21For example, quantum and classical systems have been argued to di↵er profoundly with regard to their status as
individuals, whether they support holism, and whether they exhibit ontological vagueness.
22Note that Miller (2009) has disputed that ‘propositions of metaphysics’ are all necessarily true if true at all (as
claimed by Sider 2013, p. 275). But her dispute does not extend to metaphysical propositions that are regarded
as conceptual truths. Since we saw in Section 1 that ‘being brute’ and ‘being fundamental’ are presented as
interchangeable notions, and hence (on the standard rendering) as synonymous notions, I take it that the brutalist
regards their thesis as an example of a conceptual truth.
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all kinds of quantum field, should that turn out to be incorrect we can simply substitute through-
out with a referring term for the appropriate worlds and still derive the sought conclusion. But
furthermore – and more compellingly perhaps from a naturalistic point of view – the moves that
will be made in what follows may be argued to be highly generic, and as such one can make a
case that the central morals may be expected to carry over to whatever sorts of entities the actual
fundamental kinds turn out to be.23 Finally, I should note that despite the seeming obstacles to
incorporating gravity into the basic framework of QFT, there in fact exists an active programme
attempting to do just that, and – while fledgling – this hypothesis is now enjoying some measure
of success.24 If that programme does indeed succeed, then the conclusions drawn here regarding
the explicability of the fundamental nature of the world may be more than just representative of
how the correct argument will eventually go, but rather something more definitive. For all these
reasons, then, I hope that despite the idealization it incurs with regard to the existence of gravity,
there is reason to take the present argument against brutalism seriously.
With the (physical, metaphysical, and dialectical) justifications in place for assuming that
the fundamental kinds are all kinds of quantum field, the claim I want to make is that once
understood in this way then which fundamental kinds exist the world instantiates ceases to be
a brute and inexplicable fact about it. Rather, it becomes a fact about the world that we can
partially explain. In the next section, I will say a bit more about quantum fields and how I will
interpret them, foregrounding the features that will be relevant to what is to follow.
3 Introducing Quantum Fields
To elucidate what is meant by quantum fields it is clearly to quantum field theory (QFT) that we
must look, and we will begin with presenting the ‘textbook theory’ used in work-a-day physics
(postponing for now any further interpretation). Put simply, QFT is the relativistic extension
of quantum mechanics. As such, quantum fields are quantum systems evolving in Minkowski
spacetime. To say that they are quantum systems is to say (i) that their states are capable of
superposing and (ii) that the probability of obtaining a given term of the superposition upon a
measurement is obtained via the Born rule. Thus supposing that |↵i and | i are both possible
states of a system, then (i) implies that c1|↵i + c2| i is likewise a possible state, and (ii) implies
that the probability of finding the system in |↵i or | i is given by |c1|2 and |c2|2 respectively. The
basic problem that QFT addresses is how to characterize systems with this property compatibly
with the structure of Minkowski spacetime, and a natural solution is to conceptualize quantum
systems as operator-valued functions of it. Thus just as a classical field ascribes to each point of
spacetime a real number (or n-tuple), a quantum field ascribes to each point a set of operators,
23This is because the present argument is based on the existence of constraints that issue from the requirement of
mathematical consistency in the limit that takes us to the fundamental degrees of freedom. While what precisely
these degrees of freedom are can be expected to di↵er across di↵erent physical frameworks, this is itself a generic
requirement on fundamental theories that we can expect to be non-trivial in every case. (Unfortunately, in string
theory is as yet unknown what these fundamental degrees of freedom are, including even whether they will
involve energy or spacetime. As such, we are not in a position to talk about the constraints on fundamental string
theories – meaning that it is not just my own lack of facility with the framework that accounts for why I have not
framed the present discussion in terms of strings.)
24See Percacci 2009.
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the self-adjoint elements of which will correspond to observable quantities.25
One can show that a field defined in this way generically exhibits radical non-separability,
in that in general the state of region X [ Y is not determined by the state in the subregions X
and Y .26 Nonetheless, for all that QFT embeds a deeply holistic structure, the experimental
signatures of particle physics concern well-localized phenomena, such as the discrete hits on a
photomultiplier tube after a head-on particle collision. Thus approximately localized phenomena
must be deriveable from quantum fields, and indeed they can be.27 As such, input and output
quantum states | ini and | outi, each featuring combinations of particle-like entities, may be
defined in the theory. In a collision experiment, the particles in the input state will be directed so
as to interact with one another, and what the possible experimental outcomes of this interaction
are may be deduced via the S-matrix of the theory – something straightforwardly extracted from
the Hamiltonian that describes the evolution of states from past to future times.28 Putting things
schematically, then, we have
| outi = S | ini. (1)
Now suppose that, as would be typical, our experiment consists of two protons Pwith equal
and opposite momenta of magnitude |k| and energy E colliding at some scattering centre. Such
experiments are usually conducted with the aim of producing states of far greater richness than
the generic input two-proton states. Thus assuming the energy is su ciently high to pass the
relevant particle mass thresholds, as a result of this experiment we will expect to find a number of
di↵erent combinations of particles produced. Since many di↵erent combinations are generally
possible consistent with the relevant conservation laws, the input state will be mapped by the
dynamics to a superposition of possible outcomes, so that the outcome that we will observe will
not in general be uniquely determined but rather expected with a probability given by the Born
rule. Thus we have
S |P(E, k)P(E, k)i =
X
i
ci|T1(k1)...Tn(kn)i. (2)
Here the T j denote di↵erent types of particle, so that the possible outcomes will in general
feature many combinations of di↵erent particle types, and di↵erent numbers of each.29 (Note
that here we could have Ti = T j for some i, j: perhaps two photons with unequal momenta ki and
k j are produced, for example.) Now let us simplify things and lump together all the outcomes
featuring a given combination of particles, without worrying about how the energy-momentum
is distributed among them, and let these lumped-together states be ‘qualitative outcomes’. Thus
putting things very schematically, we could, consistently with the various conservation laws,
have the state of two protons evolve through interaction into one given by the sum of the follow-
25These operators will obey the canonical commutation relations and all other commutation relations that we take
to be characteristic of a quantum system (for example, between the spin observables in di↵erent directions). To
make the theory relativistic, we impose that the operators defined at spacelike separated points commute.
26See e.g. Wallace and Timpson 2010.
27At least in regions where measurements are made, far from the interaction centre: see e.g. Myrvold 2015.
28S is extracted from the Hamiltonian via S = eiHt.
29The fact that particle number is not conserved is one of the innovations of relativistic quantum theory.
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ing qualitative outcomes:
S |P(k)P( k)i = c1|1 heavy particlei + c2|3 medium-mass particlesi + c3|5 light particlesi (3)
In accordance with the usual prescription for relating states to probabilities of observation –
namely, the Born rule – the probability of observing the ith of these qualitative outcomes upon
a run of our accelerator is given by |ci|2. Since the idea that the probabilities associated with the
elements of the sample space sum to one is an axiom of probability theory, the Born rule implies
that we must have that
P
i |ci|2 = 1 at all times. This condition that the sum of the |ci|2’s must be
preserved is encoded in the demand that the dynamics of quantum systems be norm-preserving.
Together with the assumption that the dynamics be linear (in order to accomodate superposi-
tion), this means that the dynamics that features in textbook QFT is a unitary dynamics.30
What the textbook theory refers to as ‘quantum fields’, then, are systems in relativistic
spacetime undergoing unitary evolution. In what follows, we will make the following strong
– and strongly metaphysical – assumption: we will assume that quantum fields are not merely
contingently but essentially such as to evolve unitarily. In other words, we will hold that unitary
evolution is a necessary feature of quantum fields, true of them in every possible world in which
they occur; though not merely in the sense that, for example, being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is neces-
sarily true of them, but rather in a way that is more reflective of their nature.31 This assumption
of course warrants comment, with regard both to its standing vis-a-vis the interpretation of quan-
tum theory and its implications for our metaphysics of physics.
Regarding the first, it should be noted that there exist interpretations of quantum mechanics
in which unitarity is violated, such as the GRW collapse theory: while in that context the dynam-
ics remains norm-preserving, it now contains non-linear collapse terms in addition to the linear
Schro¨dinger evolution. However, the standing of collapse interpretations in relativistic settings
is at present unclear at best. The only interpretation of quantum mechanics that is known to be
consistent with the principles of relativity, namely the Everett (or ‘many-worlds’) interpretation,
postulates only the dynamics of the ‘textbook theory’ and hence respects unitarity. As such,
the only established candidate for an interpretation of QFT – a relativistic theory – in one in
which fields evolve unitarily. While this is not the place to go into detail on the relationship
of the many-worlds theory to modal theories more generally, su ce to say that our assumption
of essential unitarity is at least consistent with the only interpretation of quantum theory that is
known to be relativistically covariant. This surely counts as a point in its favour.32
30This postulate is expressed in the requirement that S †S = 1, where ‘†’ denotes the Hermitian conjugate.
31See Fine 1995. Note that it is compatible with this that their unitary evolution is a consequence of a more funda-
mental feature of quantum fields (hence part of their ‘consequential’ rather than their ‘constitutive essence’, in
Fine’s sense).
32It may be noted that the crucial constraints on particle content to be derived below rely explicitly (as we will
see) only on the conservation of the norm, not linearity. Furthermore, the dynamics of the GRW theory is both
norm-preserving and was designed, at least in the non-relativistic context, to reproduce the empirical predictions
of quantum theory – and what particle content the world contains surely counts as one such. Nevertheless,
it remains that the constraints that do the work in the ensuing argument were derived in the textbook theory,
and it has not (to my knowledge) been established that these constraints on particle content are reproducible in
frameworks that do not respect linearity. Hence for now I opt for safety over generality and focus on showing
how the fundamental could be explained under one interpretation of quantum theory, postponing discussion of
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Regarding its status with respect to positions in the metaphysics of physics, the claim that
quantum fields are essentially such as to evolve unitarily seems to constitute a quintessentially
metaphysical assumption – one that has implications for the mathematical form of the dynamics
in every possible world in which fields exist. As such, Humeans will likely reject it. But our aim
here is not to generate an explanation of the fundamental that will be acceptable to everyone,
only to show that an explanation of the fundamental is possible given some recognizable (and
recognizablymetaphysical) assumptions – for surely that su ces to undermine brutalism’s status
as an uncontroversial metaphysical doctrine. We can note further that in making this assumption
we are at least in good company, since Ismael and Scha↵er (2016) have recently expressed a
similar conviction in their recent discussion of the metaphysics of the wavefunction.33 (The
worry that there is something ‘trivial’ about the resulting explanation – an accusation often
waged at anti-Humean explanation in general – will be addressed below in Section 6.)
Of course, much more could be said in defence of any claim that an entity is essentially
such-and-such. Nevertheless, I take it that the assumption that quantum fields are not merely
contingently but essentially such as to evolve unitarily constitutes a reasonable metaphysical
assumption. With it in place, let us now see how we can put it use in explaining the fundamental.
4 Pinning Down the Fundamental Kinds
The task that we have set ourselves is to show that the fact that the world contains a certain suite
of fundamental kinds, which we have denoted FK , is a fundamental fact about the world that
may nevertheless be partially explained. As noted, one challenge we face in so doing stems
from the fact that we do not know what the fields actually featuring in FK are. But as has
also been noted, there is a workaround here, predicated on the fact that we have postulated
something about the natures of the systems involved – namely, that they are essentially such as
to evolve unitarily. As we will see, this constrains FK enormously, and this will go a long way
to furnishing us with the claim sought. In this section we will focus on why it is that FK is so
constrained, bringing that constraint into contact with theories of explanation in the next section.
Our interest lies with the fundamental kinds, and among the laws that fundamental kinds
accord with are of course the fundamental laws.34 Let us then take a moment to consider in virtue
of what a law deserves to be called ‘fundamental’. While one might try to capture this notion in
a variety of ways, it seems uncontroversial to say that fundamental laws are those that operate
at the very smallest spatial scales.35 Given that we are assuming that the fundamental entities
the strategy’s generalization to collapse interpretations to another occasion.
33They write: ‘There is a global constraint on the shape of the wave function, which is that its squared amplitudes
must sum to 1. (Nothing else allows the wave function to play its calculational role with respect to the proba-
bilities of observables. Since the amplitudes are squared to produce probabilities, a wave function whose shape
violated this constraint would produce mathematical impossibilities.).... It might then be rejoined that [this] point
about the wave (the global constraint that its squared amplitudes must sum to 1) represent[s] merely contingent
happenstance.... We are skeptical of treating [this matter] as contingenc[y].’
34I say ‘among’ here because fundamental entities might be argued to accord with non-fundamental laws too. As
such, we arguably cannot define a fundamental law simply as that which fundamental entities accord with.
35This is because non-fundamental laws in QFT may in principle be derived from more fundamental laws by the
(irreversible) process of ‘integrating out’ high-energy degrees of freedom, hence the degrees of freedom describ-
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are housed in Minkowski spacetime, and that the latter has a continuous structure, it follows that
fundamental laws of QFT must remain correct descriptions of phenomena at arbitrarily small
scales. In this sense, the fundamental laws of QFT are required to be ‘continuum compatible’.36
Since complementarity places an inverse relationship between energetic and spatial scales, it
follows from this that a fundamental law of QFT is one that remains correct as a description even
as interaction energies grow arbitrarily high.37 A fundamental law of quantum fields, then, is one
that never needs supplanting no matter how fast our accelerators may grow, and hence one that
continues to make correct empirical predictions even as energies get arbitrarily high. Now recall
that quantum fields are here understood as systems whose nature is such as to undergo unitary
evolution. Putting everything together, then, a fundamental law is one which, at a minimum,
retains the property of being unitary even in the E ! 1 limit.
This minimum necessary condition is easy enough to argue for, and even relatively intu-
itive. But while deriving this condition is straightforward, actually finding a law that satisfies it
turns out to be extraordinarily di cult. The condition in fact turns out to be so demanding that
prima facie we would not expect any given quantum field theory to succeed in meeting it. At the
root of this di culty lies the fact that, in QFT, the interaction couplings codifying the strength of
interactions are themselves functions of energy, and one can show generically that if a coupling
diverges in the limit then the calculated probabilities associated with the outcomes of the theory
will diverge as well.38 One says in that case that the dynamics violates unitarity bounds, where
such bounds are given by any mathematical relationship that follows from the requirement that
the probability attached to any one empirical outcome can never exceed 1. Given the Born rule,
it follows from this violation that at some energy the dynamics ceases to be unitary (since it
is clearly no longer norm-preserving). The corresponding change of the strength of interaction
couplings is described by the renormalization group equation associated with the theory, which
describes the change for each interaction coupling gi in terms of a  -function:
E
@gi(E)
@E
=  (gi, g j, ..., E). (4)
One can show that the  -function describing the change in the behaviour of any one coupling
is a function of all the couplings g j that feature in the theory, and hence (it turns out) the spins
and masses of all the fields present.39 This makes the act of actually solving any one of these
equations a rather formidable mathematical challenge, and as such it is extremely di cult to
show that the couplings will tend to a finite value in the limit, as required of a fundamental
ing processes in the smallest spatiotemporal regions (see e.g. Castellani 2002). Since the fields whose behaviour
is described in these laws have – as noted above in Section 3 – a highly holistic character, the state-dependent
properties that these regions instantiate will in general be a function of the properties of the whole. As such, there
is scope to combine this conception of fundamental laws with a ‘priority monism’ at the level of properties (cf.
Scha↵er 2010): for in order for the laws to correctly describe the properties of the very smallest regions, they
must also correctly describe the whole.
36Cf. Huggett and Weingard 1995. General considerations in quantum gravity suggest the possibility of a discrete
spacetime. But that possibility remains speculative (even more so than the theories themselves).
37We can take it as a given that the fundamental law is a law of interaction. It is hard to see how there could even be
such a thing as a levels structure at all without interactions in the base.
38See Percacci 2012.
39See e.g. Collins 2008, Sec. 7.7.
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theory. Nevertheless, despite these mathematical challenges, it is not di cult to be convinced
that actually finding a theory that stays norm-preserving in the limit is likely to prove extremely
di cult. For consider that the probabilities ci attached to the qualitative outcomes in expression
(3) above are in general going to be functions of the interaction energy. (For example, in order to
create the Higgs particle, we had to wait until we had an accelerator that could supply an energy
equal to its mass. But since the probability attached to the qualitative outcome containing that
particle switches at that energy from zero to something finite, then the probabilities attached to
the qualitative outcomes creatable at lower energies must correspondingly go down – probabil-
ities must, after all, sum to one.) As such, it is clear that each ci = ci(E). Now consider the
probability functions that are implied by a fundamental theory in particular. Since the laws of
this theory must be well-defined in the E ! 1 limit, each ci must at the very least stay finite
in that same limit – for otherwise the theory is not well-defined, and certainly the |ci|2 make no
sense as probabilities. But a priori we know that it is only a very special class of functions –
the convergent functions – that stay finite as their variables diverge. In this sense, we know that
the fundamental law must have a rather special mathematical structure to imply only functions
of this sort – the set of convergent functions being a measure-zero set after all.
But this turns out to be just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the mathematical ‘spe-
cialness’ of fundamental theories: for in order to stay well-defined in the limit not only must any
one probability function be rather special individually, but they must also be supremely special
collectively. For simple combinatorics, combined with the fact that energies can in principle
increase without limit (at least according to QFT), means that there is equally no limit in princi-
ple to the number of possible combinations of particles that can be produced in interactions as
energies grow high enough. Thus we can see that the number of qualitative outcomes associated
with a fundamental theory will tend to infinity in the same limits in which it is required to be
well-defined. And yet it must be that the ci associated with each of these outcomes remain so
exquisitely in concert with one another that they continue to sum to one, no matter how high the
energy grows, and hence no matter how many qualitative outcomes must be taken into consid-
eration – even though we know that there is no limit in principle to how many this is. Hopefully
no further persuasion is needed to grant that keeping so many balls in the air at once is a highly
non-trivial mathematical feat, and hence that writing down a law that actually has this feature is
far from straightforward. Thus even before we start thinking about whether or not a given can-
didate expression for interactions between quantum fields is ‘correct’ in the sense of empirically
adequate, we are going to have our work cut out establishing that it is even a coherent possibility.
Given that continuum-compatible laws, then, are going to be extremely rare finds, one
might wonder what the hallmarks of a theory are that suggest it is befitting of that accolade.
Predictably, however, any attempt to address this question must confront the rather intimidating
mathematical intractabilities gestured at above, and partly as a result of this we are as yet unable
to say anything that is fully general. However, there exists a special class of fundamental theories
for which we do have demonstrable and precise criteria. This is the class of theories whose
interaction couplings, upon which probabilities depend, not only stay finite in the E ! 1 limit
– a condition known as asymptotic safety – but furthermore tend to zero. These latter theories
are known as asymptotically free. It will be clear that the asymptotically free theories are but
a special class of fundamental theories: there are, after all, many more ways to stay finite than
to tend to zero in particular. Nevertheless, one can argue that something comparable to what
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is true for those will also be true of the more general class, in that in each case we can expect
stringent constraints on field content although the precise nature of the constraints will likely be
di↵erent in the two cases.40 As such, in what follows I will explicitly discuss only the case of
asymptotically free theories, and use those as our model of fundamental theories; but it should
be borne in mind that the precise nature of the constraints on kind content to be deduced here
will likely be di↵erent in the general case.
What, then, are these constraints that asymptotically free theories – those serving as our
model of fundamental theories – have to satisfy? The answer emerged across a series of seminal
papers published in 1973. The first relevant result for our purposes was shown by Coleman
and Gross, who argued, in a proof by cases, that only theories containing non-Abelian gauge
bosons had a claim on being fundamental.41 In more detail, they argued that if a theory contains
any Abelian gauge bosons, the  -function associated with the theory will diverge and hence
unitarity bounds be violated; similarly if a theory contains only spinless mesons; and similarly if
it contains only spinless mesons and fermions. (Since they were focussing on ‘renormalizable’
theories they did not explicitly consider theories containing only fermions, but it can be shown
that non-renormalizable theories cannot be asymptotically free either.42) In all cases in which
non-Abelian gauge bosons are absent, then, the interaction couplings will fail to approach zero
in the E ! 1 limit, leading them to conclude that it is impossible to achieve asymptotic freedom
without the presence of non-Abelian gauge bosons. And although I will not do so here, it may
be shown that the number of bosons in any given case is uniquely determined by the symmetry
of the theory in question: for example, QCD – the theory of the strong interactions – will contain
8 gauge bosons (‘gluons’) as a result of the fact that it is based in the gauge group SU(3).43 It
should be underlined that this is a significant constraint upon quantum field theories, as there are
plenty of workable or ‘e↵ective’ theories that nevertheless fail to feature gauge bosons: famous
examples are the Fermi model of the weak interaction, or the Nambu–Jona-Lasin˜o model of
condensed matter, both of which contain fermions alone. What Coleman and Gross’ result tells
us is that, while these may be perfectly good as non-fundamental descriptions of nature, they
will nevertheless break down somewhere. As such, they cannot be candidates for fundamental
descriptions.
The second relevant result, shown first by Gross and Wilczek, is that the presence in a
gauge theory of too many fermions will have an e↵ect on the  -function that tends to destablize
40The problem in both cases is that the renormalization group equation (4) that determines whether a theory is
continuum compatible or not is a function of all the couplings in the theory. But in QFT masses function as a
kind of coupling, and the dimension of a coupling is determined by the spins of the coupled fields. Thus for any
fundamental theory to be well-behaved in the limit, there will have be constraints on its matter content, even if
we do not have the wherewithal to determine precisely what these constraints are in every case. One might say
that the underlying disease is the same in all instances, although the details of the treatment will di↵er.
41Coleman and Gross 1973. While the mathematical vocabulary will not be defined here, su ce to say that non-
Abelian gauge bosons are bosons associated with non-Abelian symmetry groups, and include particles such a
gluons. Photons are an example of Abelian gauge bosons.
42Theories containing only fermions are always non-renormalizable, and asymptotically free theories are always
renormalizable: see Weinberg 1979, p. 806.
43The set of gauge bosons is identified with the adjoint representation of the relevant symmetry group, and what this
is is determined by the group structure itself.
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a theory’s asymptotic freedom.44 As such, while some fermions are permitted, there is an upper
limit on how many there can be.45 For example, Gross and Wilczek showed that QCD can
accommodate up to 16 types of fermion, but any more will cause it to run afoul of asymptotic
freedom. Again, it should be emphasized that what this number is is determined by the symmetry
of the theory, and as such is intimately related to the number of gauge bosons that are present.
Thus in QCD the fact that up to 16 fermions are allowed is closely related to the fact there are 8
bosons.
Putting everything together, then, we may say that a theory can be expected to be asymp-
totically free only if:
• the theory contains some number N> 0 of non-Abelian gauge bosons;
• the number of fermions does not exceed some number M, with M intimately related to N.
We seen, then, that theories cannot contain too many types of field if it is to exhibit asymp-
totic freedom, but they cannot contain too few either. It therefore seems right to say that if the
fundamental entities are quantum fields – and hence the fundamental kinds are all kinds of quan-
tum field – then a sort of ‘Goldilock’s principle’ constrains the combinations of fundamental
kinds that can co-exist at a world. Taking Bi to be bosonic fields and Fi fermionic, we may state
this principle as follows:
Goldilock’s principle for fundamental kinds (GP): Whatever the actual inventory
of fundamental kinds FK is, it will take the form B1,...BN; F1...FM, for some N> 0
and with an upper bound on M, and with M and N related.
The GP is clearly a significant constraint on a law of nature: it is emphatically not the case
that an arbitrarily selected combination of fields will be expected to satisfy it. Thus we cannot
expect an arbitrarily selected list of fundamental fields to be a candidate for FK . Nevertheless,
for all that it represents a highly non-trivial constraint, it is crucial to note that the GP does not
itself pin down FK uniquely. Not only does it fail to determine precisely which bosons are
realized (while severely constraining what the possibilities are), but there is also some tolerance
in how many types of fermions are permitted. In the case of QCD above, for example, while
up to 16 kinds of quark are permitted in the theory, it is currently believed that in fact only 6
are realized in nature. Since QCD could be consistently formulated even with only one type of
quark, there is quite a bit of leeway in what is possible. As such, while the Goldilock’s principle
places a significant constraint on the kinds that can feature in an asymptotically free theory, this
constraint fails to fully determine what those kinds are.
Now to repeat, what has been said on behalf of the constraints on kinds featuring in a
fundamental theory applies only the asymptotically free theories – a very special class of funda-
mental QFTs. However, as was also underlined, we can expect there to be analogous (although
not identical) constraints in the general case of asymptotically safe theories. As such, although
44Gross and Wilczek 1973.
45As Coleman later put it, “Theories of non-Abelian gauge fields and Fermi multiplets are sometimes asymptotically
free and sometimes not. The fermions make a positive contribution to the beta-function; if the theory has too
many fermions, the sign of beta is reversed and asymptotic freedom is lost” (Coleman 1985, p. 179).
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for ease of presentation we will take satisfaction of the Goldilock’s principle to be a general
constraint on fundamental theories, only something analogous to it will be true in general and
that ought to be borne in mind. But for all that, what I want to claim now is that the existence
of the GP (or its analogue) gives us reason for thinking that what fundamental kinds the world
contains is not a brute and inexplicable fact about it. Rather, it is one for which we can give a
partial explanation.
5 Partially Explaining the Fundamental Kinds
Recall that it is a tenet of physicalist brutalism that what fundamental kinds the world instantiates
is a brute and inexplicable fact about it. As such, whatever it is that FK turns out to be, it is not
something for which any explanation can be given. This commitment we called B(FK).
Brutalism about fundamental kinds (B(FK)): Suppose that, of the fundamental
kinds, those instantiated in the world are K1,...,Kp. Let these kinds be collectively
denoted FK . Then that the fundamental kinds that are instantiated in the world are
FK is a fact for which no metaphysical explanation can be given.
If we want to argue against brutalism, then, we need to show that B(FK) is false – hence that
at least some explanation can be given for the fact that the fundamental kinds instantiated in the
world are the kinds FK . It must, however, be conceded at this point that it is unclear how to
actually go about showing this, since the type of explanation that is relevant in this context is
hardly immediately obvious. Given that FK is a fundamental feature of the world, the fact of its
existence is ex hypothesi ungrounded; and since FK is not in any reasonable sense an ‘event’ it
cannot be subject to causal explanation either. But since ‘grounding explanation’ is often taken
as synonymous with ‘metaphysical explanation’, and ‘causal explantion’ as the paradigm of
‘scientific explanation’, it is wholly unclear what remaining options there are in the metaphysics
of science for explaining what we want to explain.46
But our lack of familiarity with the relevant form of explanation might be just another
expression of the brutalist bias. To argue that there is an explanation afoot here, I propose we
adopt the following strategy. First, look for precedents in the literature on scientific explanation
that have a relevantly similar formal structure to the explanation that would be appropriate here.
Second, look to features pertaining to the content of that explanation to see if it may be charac-
terized as ‘metaphysical’ in a recognizable sense. The reason I suggest proceeding in this way –
in particular, by looking to the philosophy of science for the relevant formal notions – is because
only there does there seem to be any well-developed framework for modelling explanation in
the absence of full determination.47 Since it is unclear why indeterministic explanation should
46I note that the other major notion of scientific explanation, namely unificationism, is regarded as the paradigm of
‘explanation’ in the sense of psychological achievement (see e.g. Craver 2014). I take it however that metaphysi-
cal explanation is necessarily ontic, and hence even if there were some explanation by unification available here I
would not consider it a counterexample to brutalism. (Reasons for thinking – and rejecting – that FK is partially
grounded will be discussed below.)
47For example, Wilsch (2016, p. 15) states that ‘Since there is no metaphysical analogue to statistical explanations,
the laws of metaphysics are deterministic.’ But no argument is given for this claim. Similarly Ruben (1992, p.
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be sanctioned in science and yet not in metaphysics (at least not without begging the question),
should we succeed in locating a precedent in the philosophy of science with respect to the form
of explanation we will be well on our way to undermining brutalism.48
Let’s begin by mooting a ‘general thesis about explanation’ according to which ‘we call
for explanation only of what, although we know it is so, might have been otherwise for all else
of some suitable sort we know’; that is, that we call for an explanation when there is a ‘gap,
between knowledge of what is and what must be’.49 Thus a proposed explanation will satisfy
our demands to the extent that it succeeds in closing that gap – succeeds, that is, in ruling out
other ways that the world might have been distinct from how it in fact is. It follows that, in
the ideal case, the explanans will entail the explanandum. Schematic as it is, that observation
surely captures something important about what we aspire to from explanations, and in the
scientific context found its first expression in the deductive-nomological model proposed by
Carl Hempel.50 This is a model intended to capture the scientific explanation of events, and
amounts to the claim that we can be said to have explained an event when its occurrence may be
deduced from premises expressing laws together with relevant statements of particular fact. As
is well known, it did not take long for the shortcomings of the original DN-model to come into
view (Hempel himself quickly abandoned it). But it was in any case obvious from the beginning
that deductive entailment was untenable as a general demand on event explanation in science.
Scientists, after all, have presumably been able to o↵er at least some explanation of all sorts
of events even in cases in which they have been unable, perhaps unavoidably, to show that the
explanandum follows with certainty given the explanans – whether it be a smoker contracting
lung cancer or the successful detonation of a nuclear bomb. Thus models of explanation that
relaxed the requirement of logical entailment, focussing instead on simply ‘narrowing’ the gap,
began to be developed. Such explanations, given that they fail to determine the explanandum,
we may dub ‘indeterministic explanations’.
The examples just provided of smoking and uranium are canonical in the literature on inde-
terministic explanation, and more specifically canonical examples of probabilistic explanation.
By now, of course, there exist a great many distinct proposals for how such explanation works.
However, we need not concern ourselves with the vicissitudes of probabilistic explanation here,
simply because no notion of probabilistic explanation seems appropriate for our purposes. The
reason is simply that there doesn’t seem to be anything in the considerations above that would
232): ‘I do not think that there are any other nondeterminative explanations other than those which would arise
on the basis of explanation by nondeterministic causes’ – although he goes on to invite ‘the reader [to] think of
other candidates for nondeterministic relations that can be explanatory, other than nondeterministic causation’.
This paper provides an example.
48It may be asked why I do not consider the counterfactual theory of explanation here – an approach to explanation
that has been subject to a fair bit of contemporary discussion, partly on account of its seeming ability to cover
both causal and non-causal explanations (see Reutlinger 2016). The reason is that the explanation purported here
depends crucially on the assumption that fields are essentially, and hence necessarily, such as to evolve unitarily.
But the counterfactual theory of explanation is inapplicable in cases in which the explanans is necessarily true
(see Reutlinger op. cit., Section 4).
49Mellor op. cit., p. 234.
50Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965. If this seems a little staid, note that the ‘papers [on the DN-model]
and the reaction to them have structured subsequent discussion concerning scientific explanation to an extraordi-
nary degree’ (Woodward 2014).
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allow us to attach a probability, either absolute or relative, to FK or any other inventory of
fundamental kinds permitted by the GP – hence nothing that would allow us to connect with any
theory of probabilistic explanation at all.
Were probabilistic explanation the only form of indeterministic explanation the philosophy
of science literature sanctioned, then, it would not furnish any resources for denying B(FK).
Fortunately, however, and although rather less well-known, there is another notion lurking in
the neighbourhood that is more congenial to our purposes. This is Hempel’s notion of partial
explanation.51 Another variant of the DN model, it holds that we have some claim to have an
explanation of an event when we can deduce that some event in a circumscribed class will take
place, without correspondingly being able to deduce that any particular member of that class is
the one to be actualized.
Hempel illustrates what he has in mind with the following example (which I quote at
length).
In his Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud o↵ers the following explanation of a slip of
the pen that occurred to him: ‘On a sheet of paper containing principally short daily notes
of business interest I found, to my surprise, the incorrect date, “Thursday, October 20th,”
bracketed under the correct date of the month of September. It was not di cult to explain
this anticipation as the expression of a wish. A few days before I had returned fresh from
my vacation and felt ready for any amount of professional work, but as yet there were few
patients. On my arrival I had found a letter from a patient announcing her arrival on the 20th
of October. As I wrote the same date in September I may certainly have thought ‘X. ought
to be here already; what a pity about that whole month,’ and with this thought I pushed the
current date a month ahead.
Clearly, the formulation of the intended explanation is at least incomplete [in that] it fails to
mention any laws or theoretical principles in virtue of which the subconscious wish, and the
other antecedent circumstances referred to, could be held to explain Freud’s slip of the pen.
However, the general theoretical considerations Freud presents here and elsewhere in his
writings suggests strongly that his explanatory account relies on a hypothesis to the e↵ect
that when a person has a strong, though perhaps unconscious, desire, then if he commits a
slip of pen, tongue, memory, or the like, the slip will take a form in which it expresses, and
perhaps symbolically fulfills, the given desire. But clearly, such expression and fulfillment
might have been achieved by many other kinds of slip of the pen than the one actually
committed.
In other words, the explanans does not imply, and thus fully explain, that the particular
slip, say s, which Freud committed on this occasion, would fall within the narrow class,
say W, of acts which consist in writing the words “Thursday, October 20th”; rather, the
explanans implies only that s would fall into a wider class, say F, which includes W as a
proper subclass, and which consists of all acts which would express and symbolically fulfill
Freud’s subconscious wish in some way or other.
The argument under consideration might be called a partial explanation: it provides com-
plete, or conclusive, grounds for expecting s to be a member of F, and sinceW is a subclass
of F, it thus shows that the explanandum, i.e., s falling within W, accords with, or bears
51Note that Hempel’s sense of ‘partial explanation’ di↵ers from that of Ruben (op. cit., pp. 19-20). Ruben’s sense
seems to correspond to Hempel’s ‘elliptic explanation’ (Hempel 1962, p. 16).
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out, what is to be expected in consideration of the explanans. By contrast, a deductive-
nomological explanation [...] might then be called complete since the explanans here does
imply the explanandum.52
Although, like Hempel’s original DN model, this variant of DN-explanation is concerned
specifically with the explanation of events, from a formal point of view it mirrors precisely the
situation we find ourselves in with respect to FK .53 For whatever FK is, we have ‘complete
grounds for expecting’ it to be a member of the ‘wider class’ of inventories of kinds that are
compatible with the Goldilock’s principleGP – a constraint that rules out many, indeed infinitely
many, combinations of kinds that might have been expected a priori. As such, this represents
a non-trivial constraint on what FK can be. However, we lack any resources at this point to
go further and determine precisely which of the inventories within the class of those compatible
with the GP is the particular one that is realized. For these reasons, structurally speaking we
may be said to have a partial explanation for why the fundamental kinds that are instantiated in
the world are the kinds FK .
Were Hempel correct in his initial intuition that the satisfaction of this schema gives us
grounds for saying that we have a partial explanation, we would have grounds to stop at this
point and declare brutalism to be false: for since the fundamental kinds instantiated by the
world is now something for which partial explanation may be given, it is not the case that ‘no
explanation’ can be given of the fundamental after all. However, the idea that the satisfaction
of the DN schema – and so also, we may take it, the weakened version foregrounded here – is
su cient for explanation came under attack almost as soon as the model itself emerged. As was
forcefully pressed by Salmon and others, that idea would have as a consequence that we can
explain the length of a flagpole by that of its shadow or the coming of a storm by the falling of a
barometer. Observations such as these gave rise to a family of responses, each of which may be
roughly but usefully surmised as holding that explanation consists of nomic expectability ‘plus
something else’, such as the existence of underlying causal processes.54
This phenomenon that mere entailment does not su ce for explanation may also be wit-
nessed in the context of metaphysical explanation – in particular, in the context of the literature
on grounding explanation. In this context, it is universally held that while the claim that  
grounds   implies that  entails  , the converse is not true – grounding having been introduced
into the literature explicitly as a relation more discerning than mere modal or logical notions.
As such, mere entailment does not su ce for explanation even though a necessary feature it.55
For example, it is widely held that while one can claim that the existence of Socrates entails the
52Hempel 1962, pp. 17-18.
53One might want to object to this claim, on the grounds that a statement of law has not been included in the
premises – only a statement concerning a structural feature of them (namely, that they must be unitary). But
since we are not aiming at an explanation of events, this is entirely appropriate. In place of a law of nature we
have a universally quantified claim – a ‘metaphysical covering law’ (cf. Sider (2011, p. 145) – about the nature
of quantum fields, which we will argue below makes for a metaphysical explanation. (Note that Hempel himself
(1965, p. 352) is explicit that DN-style explanations need not always be causal; see also Reutlinger 2016, Section
1. On the application of the DN model to metaphysical explanations, specifically grounding explanations, see
Wilsch 2016.)
54See Woodward op. cit., Section 2.5.
55See e.g. Rosen 2012, Section 5.
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existence of {Socrates} and also vice versa, only in the former case do we have a correspond-
ing relation of grounding and hence an attendant explanation. However, just as in the case of
scientific explanation, if one wants to claim that grounding ought be understood in terms of the
satisfaction of formal relations plus something else, one needs to say something more about how
that ‘something else’ is to be understood. What, then, can we say about what makes it the case
that {Socrates}’s existence is grounded in that of Socrates, and not vice versa?
A widely-held answer is that the symmetry is broken in relations of grounding on account
of the natures of the entities involved. That is, what accounts for the fact that {Socrates}’s
existence is grounded in that of Socrates and not vice versa is some feature of the nature or
essence of (at least one of) the relata. Such a view is explicit, for example, in the work of Fine,
and also in that of Audi.56 As Audi puts it,
[G]rounding is sensitive to the natures of its relata... It is a necessary condition of
one fact’s grounding another that the natures of the properties involved be related to
one another in some significant way. We can call this relation ‘essential connected-
ness’...
We can characterize essential connection as follows: It lies in the nature of certain
properties that their instances should stand in grounding relations. For example,
when a given instance of maroonness grounds a coincident instance of redness, this
fact manifests the natures of the relevant properties. It is part of their essence to
behave in this way when instantiated.57
Thus to return to our example, we might say – with some plausibility – that it follows from
the nature of {Socrates} that Socrates exists, and yet no way part of the nature of Socrates that
impure sets of any kind exist. As such – and without pretending that every grounding theorist
holds the same view – we may say that it is both widely held and intuitively plausible that
grounding claims are backed by facts about natures, and hence that it is these that allow us to
move (where we can) from the mere satisfaction of a formal schema to genuine instances of
grounding explanation.58
In both scientific and metaphysical contexts, then, it is agreed that mere entailment rela-
tions must be ‘backed’ by some additional feature or property if genuine explanation is to ensue.
Therefore whatever type of explanation might ultimately be involved in the explanation of the
fundamental kind structure, the fact that we have satisfied the formal schema for a partial expla-
nation is unlikely to establish that we have in fact partially explained it. Let us therefore focus
now on the content of that putative explanation, and in order to do so it will help to recapitulate
schematically the argument that has been laid out above.
1. The fundamental kinds are all kinds of quantum fields. (Stipulation as to the sort of entities
populating the fundamental level.)
56See e.g. Fine 2012, p. 72; Audi 2012. (For Audi, the natures of both relata are involved; for Fine, only that of the
grounded. But these di↵erences do not matter for present purposes.) See also Rosen op. cit. for a more tentative
version of the same view.
57Audi 2012, pp. 693-96.
58For example, Scha↵er 2012 seems to take grounding connections to be primitive.
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2. Quantum fields are by their nature such as to evolve unitarily. (Stipulation as to the nature
of quantum fields.)
3. The fundamental level is one in which the fundamental kinds FK accord with fundamen-
tal laws. (Definition of ‘fundamental level’.)
4. Fundamental laws are laws that are consistent in E ! 1 limit. (Requirement on a‘fundamental
law’ for quantum fields.)
5. Fundamental laws of evolution must be unitary. (From 2 and 3)
6. Laws featuring a combination of kinds K01, ...,K
0
r not satisfying the Goldilock’s principle
not norm-preserving in the high-energy limit. (Demonstrated in Coleman and Gross 1973;
Gross and Wilczek 1973).
C. ) FK must belong to the class of combinations compatible with the Goldilock’s principle
(From 3, 4, 5, and 6).
As noted, this argument has the form of a partial explanation in Hempel’s sense for why
the fundamental kinds the world instantiates are the kinds FK : for while we do not know
precisely which combination of fundamental kinds will be realized, we know that whatever it is
it will belong to a highly circumscribed class. Let us now therefore look for further hallmarks of
genuine explanation that may be present in the premises, starting with premise 6. Presumably,
the fact that laws featuring arbitrary combinations of fundamental kinds do not respect unitarity
bounds, and hence are not unitary (since no longer norm-preserving) in the E ! 1 limit, is a
mathematical fact. To see this, note first that not every fact couched in mathematical language
has a mathematical as opposed to, say, a causal explanation, because those mathematical facts
could just be encoding functional relationships between certain physico-causal properties that
are doing all the real explanatory work.59 Here, however, mathematics is employed in a sort
of impossibility proof that shows there is no physical system that could exhibit the feature in
question. As such, any explanation of the fact described in premise 6 cannot derive from features
of extant physical stu↵ that happen to be described in mathematical language, but rather must
issue directly from the relevant mathematical facts themselves. Furthermore, it is obvious that
without this premise the argument would not be valid. Thus if – as has been defended – we take
a mathematical explanation to be an explanation containing at least one mathematical element
that is necessary to ensure the success of the explanation, then if our argument constitutes an
explanation at all then it is, at least in part, a mathematical explanation.60
Turn now to premise 2. This premise consists of an explicit stipulation – one that I hope to
have at least rendered defensible – as to the natures of the entities involved; as with premise 6,
it is entirely unclear how one could reformulate the argument without it. Now, we already know
that such an appeal to natures is (widely taken to be) that which transforms mere existential
59See Reutlinger 2014, Sec. 4.
60See Reutlinger ibid. for a defence of this criterion. I should say that mathematical explanation is a famously tricky
notion, and it may be argued that the characterization here is too inclusive. But since my principal interest is in
the metaphysical aspect of the purported explanation, I leave this issue for now.
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entailment into genuine grounding explanation. However, grounding seems not to be the type
of explanation involved here. The reason is that it seems to be almost universally held that there
cannot be partial grounding except as a component of full or deterministic grounding. Scha↵er,
for example, states outright that indeterministic grounding is an impossibility, and Fine, Audi,
and Litland take a partial ground to be defined in terms of its being a component of a full ground
(and not vice versa).61 Since there is no obvious way to promote our partial explanation into
a deterministic explanation, if this is right then it follows that the fact of what fundamental
kinds the world admits cannot be regarded as partially grounded. But if appeals to natures
can convert mere entailment into explanation in the case of grounding, there is no reason to
think that they cannot do explanatory work here. And while I do not claim to have a general
account of ‘metaphysical explanation’ – indeed, I doubt that anyone does – the very mention
of such language as ‘natures’ and ‘essences’ represents a warning bell for many that we have
transgressed from science into metaphysics.62 Since the explanation here relies crucially on such
appeals, I submit that it may properly be regarded as, at least in some essential part, a form of
‘metaphysical explanation’, its seeming distinctness from grounding notwithstanding.63
It seems, then, that our argument has not just the form of a partial explanation, but fur-
thermore has content that carries the hallmarks of metaphysical and mathematical explanation.
Since physics itself may be usefully thought of as an admixture of metaphysics and mathematics,
it strikes me that this is precisely what we would expect of an explanation of the fundamental
furnished by physics. As such, I think that we have good reason to say that what we have here is
a genuine, if partial, explanation of why the world instantiates the fundamental kinds that it does
in fact instantiate, and furthermore one that may properly be characterized as a metaphysical
explanation, at least in some essential part. Since brutalism is the doctrine that the fundamen-
tal has no explanation, it seems to me that brutalism is no longer tenable. Rather, it appears
that developments in science have allowed us to transcend this hallowed metaphysical doctrine,
reducing – while of course not eliminating – that which we must simply take as brute. Since
the illumination that comes by way of explanation is presumably a good, that strikes me as a
conclusion worth celebrating.64
61See Scha↵er 2016, p. 46 ; Fine 2012, p. 50; Audi 2012, p. 698; Litland op. cit., p. 20. We might argue for this
insistence as follows: since the role of grounding in metaphysics is to organize the world into ‘a tree-like structure
of fundamentality’ (Wilsch 2016, p. 1), and since something may be classed as non-fundamental only if it is fully
determined by something else, there is no meaning we can attach to relations of grounding in the absence of full
determination.
62See eg. Paul op cit., p. 5.
63Note however that my argument does not depend on the type of explanation involved here being distinct from (par-
tial) grounding explanation. All that matters is that it can be regarded as su ciently ‘metaphysical’ to represent
a counterexample to brutalism – which a partial grounding explanation clearly would. (For an argument against
the idea that partial grounds cannot occur in the absence of full, see Wilson 2014, pp. 543-44.)
64This conclusion is strongly evocative of Parfit’s (1998b) discussion of attempts to explain why anything exists
at all. There he notes that ‘even if reality cannot be fully explained’, there is nevertheless hope that ‘we may
still make progress’ (p. 24) – although he cautions that ‘if there is some explanation of the whole of reality, we
should not expect this explanation to fit neatly into some familiar category’ (p. 26) of scientific or distinctively
philosophical explanation. Rather, we can expect to find ourselves in a situation in which ‘there is no clear
boundary here between philosophy and science’, for at this level we are seeking explananda ‘of the same kind as
those that physicists are trying to discover’ (p. 27). It will be clear that I have said essentially the same thing,
mutatis mutandis, regarding the explanation of the fundamental.
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6 Objections
It must be admitted that the argument I have outlined above was rather involved – consisting as
it did of many moving parts, and several contenious parts at that. As a result, I anticipate at least
the following objections to be mounted against this denial of brutalism.
1. Mere partial explanation is not enough for metaphysical purposes. This objection can-
not fully be assessed without deeper thought as to what purpose is served by explanation
in metaphysics. But explanation is not an all-or-nothing a↵air in either science or every-
day life, and I fail to see any reason to think that it ought to be that way in metaphysics.
In the absence of some further defence of this claim, it simply begs the question.
2. The argument only shows that our assumption that FK is a fundamental feature of
the world was incorrect. Given that FK is not fully determined, this cannot be right
on any determination-based conception of the relation between the fundamental and non-
fundamental, such as those based on grounding. (Without full determination, the non-
fundamental loses its ‘free lunch’ character.) And were we to adopt a di↵erent conception
of fundamentality, such as the ‘joint-carving’ notion of Sider, then I can only repeat that
the fundamental kinds have always been taken as paradigms of joint-carving notions. As
such, resorting to this response at best implants us in the thick of Duhem-Quine territory.
But the refusal to give up brutalism whatever the cost would render it more a regulative
principle than a substantive metaphysical claim, and it should be asked what it is about
brutalism that really entitles it to such protected status.
3. Since it proceeds from an overtly non-Humean assumption that fields are essentially
such as to evolve unitarily, the conclusion is trivial. Again, there is a lot to say here. But
for now, su ce to say that the explanation o↵ered here of why the fundamental kinds in-
stantiated in the world are the kinds that they are is importantly disanalogous from the sort
of anti-Humean explanations o↵ered by, for example, dispositional essentialists. What
dispositional essentialists claim to have an explanation for is the regularities we observe
in the causal order of events, and what are posited in order to explain them are ‘disposi-
tional essences’ that are explicitly designed to reproduce such regularities. As such, one
can certainly argue that the resulting essence-based explanations for observed regularities
are unilluminating and trivial. Here, however, we start with a stipulation regarding the
nature of quantum fields of any kind – that they are the sort of thing to evolve unitarily
– and end up with a partial explanation of what the actual fundamental kinds are. But to
be vulnerable to the objection that the essence-based explanation o↵ered here is as trivial
as that issuing from dispositional essentialism, we would have to be claiming to have an
explanation not of what the actual fundamental kinds are, but rather of (something like)
why the probabilities associated with determinate measurement outcomes are given by
the Born rule. But we – while surely being committed to it – make no claim to having
explained that. What we do claim to have an explanation for is a fact distinct in almost
every respect from that which was put in by hand, and as such I do not see how it can be
regarded as ‘trivial’ in anything like the above sense.65
65I note further that nowhere, to my knowledge, in the literature on dispositional essentialism does anyone claim to
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There is much more to be said about both the content of these objections and the responses
to them; no doubt numerous other objections wait in the wings too. But I hope at least to have
shown that brutalism, if it is to remain axiomatic in metaphysics, stands in need of a far more
developed articulation and defence that it has received until now. To those who continue to
feel, despite all my protestations, that the explanation o↵ered here somehow fails to qualify as
su ciently ‘metaphysical’ to falsify brutalism, perhaps they can take the opportunity to explain
why such a view is forced upon us, or what its benefits are supposed to be. For such a situation
cannot help but remind me of similar protests to the e↵ect that scientific explanations are in
principle incapable of falsifying religious doctrines either. So if nothing else, let this be an
invitation for brutalists to outline more precisely the content of their hypothesis and its felt
motivations, and what it is about physics that in principle cannot surmount the explanatory gap
that has been taken to define the central subject matter of metaphysics.
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